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Abstract— In this work, a non-cooperative power control game
for multi-carrier CDMA systems is proposed. In the proposed
game, each user needs to decide how much power to transmit over
each carrier to maximize its overall utility. The utility function
considered here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted
per joule of energy consumed. It is shown that the user’s utility
is maximized when the user transmits only on the carrier with
the best “effective channel”. The existence and uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium for the proposed game are investigated and
the properties of equilibrium are studied. Also, an iterative and
distributed algorithm for reaching the equilibrium (if it exists)
is presented. It is shown that the proposed approach results
in a significant improvement in the total utility achieved at
equilibrium compared to the case in which each user maximizes
its utility over each carrier independently.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power control is used for resource allocation and interfer-
ence management in both the uplink and downlink of code
division multiple access (CDMA) systems. In the uplink, the
purpose of power control is for each user to transmit enough
power so that it can achieve the required quality of service
(QoS) at the uplink receiver without causing unnecessary
interference to other users in the system. Game theory has
been used as an effective tool to study power control for data
networks (see for example [1–6]). Taking this approach, it
is shown in [1] and [3] that Nash equilibrium is achieved
when all the users aim for a target SIR, γ∗. This is true even
when the matched filter is replaced by the decorrelator or the
minimum mean square error (MMSE) receiver as shown in
[4]. Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies such that no user
can unilaterally improve its own utility (which is a measure
of user satisfaction) given the strategies taken by other users.
Extension of the above results to multiantenna systems are
also presented in [5].
Multi-carrier CDMA, which combines the benefits of or-
thogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) with those
of CDMA, is considered to be a potential candidate for next
generation high data-rate wireless systems (see [7]). In this
work, we consider an orthogonal multi-carrier DS-CDMA
system and propose a non-cooperative power control game in
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which each user tries to choose its transmit power over each
carrier to maximize its overall utility. For the proposed game,
we will address the following questions. When does a Nash
equilibrium exist? What kind of carrier allocations among the
competing users will occur at a Nash equilibrium? Will there
be an even spread of usage of the carriers among users? How
does this approach compare with an approach in which each
user simply optimizes over each carrier independently?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we provide some background for this work by discussing the
power control game for the single-carrier case. The power con-
trol game for multi-carrier systems is presented in Section III.
The Nash equilibrium and its existence for the proposed game
are discussed in Section IV and a distributed algorithm for
reaching the equilibrium (if it exists) is presented in Section V.
The case of two-carrier systems is studied in more details
in Section VI. Numerical results and conclusions are given
in Sections VII and VIII, respectively. Our focus throughout
this work is on the uplink, where user terminals transmit to a
common concentration point such as a cellular base station.
II. BACKGROUND
Let us first look at the power control game with a single car-
rier. To pose the power control problem as a non-cooperative
game, we first need to define a utility function suitable for
data applications. Most data applications are sensitive to error
but they can tolerate delay. It is clear that a higher signal to
interference plus noise ratio (SIR) level at the output of the
receiver will result in a lower bit error rate and hence higher
throughput. However, achieving a high SIR level requires the
user terminal to transmit at a high power which in turn results
in low battery life. In [1], the utility function of a user is
defined as the ratio of its throughput to its transmit power, i.e.
uk =
Tk
pk
. (1)
Throughput is the net number of information bits that are
transmitted without error per unit time (sometimes referred
to as goodput). It can be expressed as
Tk =
L
M
Rkf(γk), (2)
where L and M are the number of information bits and the
total number of bits in a packet, respectively. Rk and γk are the
transmission rate and the SIR for the kth user, respectively;
and f(γk) is the efficiency function representing the packet
success rate (PSR), i.e. the probability that a packet is received
without an error. Our assumption is that if a packet has one
or more bit errors, it will be retransmitted. The efficiency
function, f(γk), is assumed to be increasing and S-shaped
(sigmoidal) with f(∞) = 1. We also require that f(0) = 0
to ensure that uk = 0 when pk = 0. These assumptions are
valid in many practical systems. It should be noted that the
throughput Tk in (2) could be replaced with any increasing
concave function as long as we make sure that uk = 0 when
pk = 0. A more detailed discussion of the efficiency function
can be found in [6] and [8]. Note that for a sigmoidal efficiency
function, the utility function in (1) is quasiconcave in user’s
transmit power. This is also true if the throughput in (2) is
replaced with an increasing concave function.
Based on (1) and (2), the utility function for user k can be
written as
uk =
L
M
Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (3)
This utility function, which has units of bits/Joule, captures
very well the tradeoff between throughput and battery life and
is particularly suitable for applications where saving power is
as important as achieving a high throughput.
Power control is modeled as a non-cooperative game in
which each user tries to selfishly maximize its own utility. It is
shown in [3] that, when matched filters are used as the uplink
receivers, if user terminals are allowed to choose only their
transmit powers for maximizing their utilities, then there exists
an equilibrium point at which no user can improve its utility
given the power levels of other users (Nash equilibrium). The
equilibrium is achieved when users’ transmit powers are SIR-
balanced with γ∗, the solution to f(γ) = γ f ′(γ), as the output
SIR. Furthermore, this equilibrium is unique.
In this work, we extend this game-theoretic approach to
multi-carrier systems.
III. THE NON-COOPERATIVE POWER CONTROL GAME IN
MULTI-CARRIER SYSTEMS
Let us consider the uplink of a multi-carrier DS-CDMA
data network with K users, D carriers and processing gain N
(for each carrier). The carriers are assumed to be sufficiently
far apart so that the (spread-spectrum) signal transmitted over
each carrier does not interfere with the signals transmitted over
other carriers. At the transmitter, the incoming bits for user k
are divided into D parallel streams and each stream is spread
using the spreading code of user k. The D parallel streams are
then sent over the D (orthogonal) carriers. For the ℓth carrier,
the received signal at the uplink receiver (after chip-matched
filtering and sampling) can be represented by an N × 1 vector
as
rℓ =
K∑
k=1
√
pkℓhkℓ bkℓ sk +wℓ (4)
where bkℓ, pkℓ, hkℓ are the kth user’s transmitted bit, transmit
power and path gain, respectively, for the ℓth frequency
channel (carrier). sk is the spreading sequence for user k
which is assumed to be random with unit norm; and wℓ is
the noise vector which is assumed to be Gaussian with mean
0 and covariance σ2I. The matched filter output SIR for the
ℓth carrier of the kth user is, therefore, given by
γkℓ =
pkℓhkℓ
σ2 + 1
N
∑
j 6=k pjℓhjℓ
. (5)
We propose a non-cooperative game in which each user
chooses its transmit powers over the D carriers to maximize
its overall utility. In other words, each user (selfishly) decides
how much power to transmit over each frequency channel
(carrier) to achieve the highest overall utility. Let GD =
[K, {AMCk }, {u
MC
k }] denote the proposed non-cooperative
game where K = {1, ...,K}, and AMCk = [0, Pmax]D is the
strategy set for the kth user. Here, Pmax is the maximum
transmit power. Each strategy in AMCk can be written as
pk = [p
1
k, ..., p
D
k ]. The utility function for user k is defined as
the ratio of the total throughput over the total transmit power
for the D carriers, i.e.
uMCk =
∑D
ℓ=1 Tkℓ∑D
ℓ=1 pkℓ
, (6)
where Tkℓ is the throughput achieved by user k over the
ℓth carrier, and is given by Tkℓ = LMRkf(γkℓ). Hence,
the resulting non-cooperative game can be expressed as the
following maximization problem:
max
pk
uMCk = max
pk1,...,pkD
uMCk for k = 1, ...,K, (7)
under the constraint of non-negative powers (i.e. pkℓ ≥ 0
for all k = 1, ...,K and ℓ = 1, ..., D). Without any loss of
generality, if we assume equal transmission rates for all users,
(7) can be expressed as
max
pk1,...,pkD
∑D
ℓ=1 f(γkℓ)∑D
ℓ=1 pkℓ
for k = 1, ...,K. (8)
The relationship between γkℓ and pkℓ’s is given by (5).
IV. EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE
PROPOSED GAME
For the non-cooperative power control game proposed in
the previous section, a Nash equilibrium is a set of power
vectors, p∗1, ...,p
∗
K , such that no user can unilaterally improve
its utility by choosing a different power vector; i.e. p∗1, ...,p∗K
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
uMCk (p
∗
k,P
∗
−k) ≥ u
MC
k (pk,P
∗
−k) for all pk, (9)
and for k = 1, · · · ,K; where P∗−k contains the transmit power
vectors of all the users except for user k.
Let us define
hˆkℓ =
hkℓ
σ2 + 1
N
∑
j 6=k pjℓhjℓ
(10)
as the “effective channel gain” for user k over the ℓth carrier.
Based on (5) and (10), we have γkℓ = hˆkℓpkℓ.
Proposition 1: For user k, the utility function in (6) is
maximized when
pkℓ =
{
p∗k for ℓ = Lk
0 for ℓ 6= Lk
(11)
where Lk = argmaxℓ hˆkℓ and p∗k = min{
γ∗
hˆ
Lk
k
, Pmax}, with
γ∗ being the unique (positive) solution of f(γ) = γ f ′(γ).
Proof : We first show that f(a˜p)
p
is maximized when
p = γ∗/a˜. For this, we take the derivative of f(a˜p)
p
with respect
to p and equate it to zero. Letting γ = a˜p, we have
p
∂γ
∂p
f ′(γ)− f(γ) = 0. (12)
Since p∂γ
∂p
= γ, p∗ = min{γ∗/a˜, Pmax} maximizes f(a˜p)p ,
where γ∗ is the unique (positive) solution to f(γ) = γf ′(γ).
Now, without any loss of generality, let us assume that
hˆk1 > hˆk2 > ... > hˆkD . Then, based on the above argument
we can write f(hˆk1pk1)
pk1
≤
f(hˆk1p
∗
k)
p∗
k
for any pk1 ≥ 0, where
p∗k = γ
∗/hˆk1. Also, because hˆk1 > hˆk2 > ... > hˆkD , we
have f(hˆkℓpkℓ)
pkℓ
≤
f(hˆk1p
∗
k)
p∗
k
for all pkℓ ≥ 0 and ℓ = 2, 3, ...,K .
Based on the above inequalities, we can write
f(hˆkℓpkℓ)
f(hˆ1kp
∗
k)
≤
pkℓ
p∗k
, for ℓ = 1, 2, ..., D. (13)
Adding the D inequalities given in (13) and rewriting the
resulting inequality, we have∑D
ℓ=1 f(hˆkℓpkℓ)∑D
ℓ=1 pkℓ
≤
f(hˆk1p
∗
k)
p∗k
for all pk1, ..., pkD ≥ 0 .
(14)
This completes the proof. ✷
Proposition 1 suggests that the utility for user k is max-
imized when the user transmits only over its “best” carrier
such that the achieved SIR at the output of the matched
filter receiver is equal to γ∗. The “best” carrier is the one
with the largest effective channel gain. An alternative way
of interpreting Proposition 1 is that the utility for user k
is maximized when the user transmits only on the carrier
that requires the least amount of transmit power to achieve
γ∗ at the output of the uplink receiver. A set of power
vectors, p∗1, ...,p
∗
K , is a Nash equilibrium if and only if they
simultaneously satisfy (11).
It should also be noted that the utility-maximizing strategy
suggested by Proposition 1 is different from the waterfilling
approach discussed in [9]. This is because in [9], utility
is defined as the user’s throughput whereas here we have
defined utility as the number of bits transmitted per joule
of energy consumed. Another observation is that if we use
u˜k =
∑D
ℓ=1
Tkℓ
pkℓ
as the utility function, then the utility for user
k is maximized when the user transmits on all the carriers
at power levels that achieve γ∗ for every carrier. This is
equivalent to the case in which each user maximizes its utility
over each carrier independently.
Since at Nash equilibrium (if it exists), each user must
transmit on one carrier only, there are exactly DK possibilities
for an equilibrium. For example, in the case of K = D = 2,
there are 4 possibilities for Nash equilibrium:
• User 1 and user 2 both transmit on the first carrier.
• User 1 and user 2 both transmit on the second carrier.
• User 1 transmits on the first carrier and user 2 transmits
on the second carrier.
• User 1 transmits on the second carrier and user 2 trans-
mits on the first carrier.
Depending on the set of channel gains, i.e. hkℓ’s , the
proposed power control game may have no equilibrium, a
unique equilibrium, or more than one equilibrium. Let us for
now assume that the processing gain is sufficiently large so that
even when all K users transmit on the same carrier, γ∗ can be
achieved by all users. This is the case when N > (K − 1)γ∗.
The following proposition helps identify the Nash equilibrium
(if it exists) for a given set of channel gains.
Proposition 2: The necessary condition for user k to
transmit on the ℓth carrier at equilibrium is that
hkℓ
hki
>
Θn(ℓ)
Θn(i)
Θ0 for all i 6= ℓ , (15)
where n(i) is the number of users transmitting on the ith
carrier and
Θn =
1
1− (n− 1)γ
∗
N
n = 0, 1, ...,K. (16)
In this case, pkℓ = γ
∗σ2
hkℓ
Θn(ℓ).
Proof : Based on Proposition 1, in order for user k to
transmit on carrier ℓ at equilibrium, we must have
hˆkℓ > hˆ
i
k for all i 6= ℓ. (17)
Since n(ℓ) users (including user k) are transmitting on the ℓth
carrier and n(i) users are transmitting on the ith carrier and
all users have an output SIR equal to γ∗, we have
hˆkℓ =
hkℓ
σ2 + n(ℓ)−1
N
qℓ
, (18)
and
hˆki =
hki
σ2 + n(i)
N
qi
, (19)
where qℓ = σ
2γ∗
1− (n(ℓ)−1)γ
∗
N
and qi = σ
2γ∗
1− (n(i)−1)γ
∗
N
are the re-
ceived powers for each user on the ℓth and ith carriers, respec-
tively. Now define Θn = 1
1−(n−1) γ
∗
N
to get qℓ = σ2γ∗Θn(ℓ)
and qi = σ2γ∗Θn(i). Substituting qℓ and qi into (18) and (19)
and taking advantage of the fact that 1 + (n−1)γ
∗
N
Θn = Θn
we get
hˆkℓ =
hkℓ
Θn(ℓ)
, (20)
and
hˆki =
hki
Θn(i)
Θ0
. (21)
Consequently, (15) is obtained by substituting (20) and (21)
into (17). Furthermore, since pkℓhkℓ = qℓ = σ2γ∗Θn(ℓ), we
have pkℓ = γ
∗σ2
hkℓ
Θn(ℓ) and this completes the proof. ✷
Fig. 1. Nash Equilibrium Regions for the Case of K = 2 and D = 2
Based on (16), when N > (K − 1)γ∗, we have
0 < Θ0 < Θ1 < Θ2 < ... < ΘK with Θ1 = 1.
For each of the DK possible equilibria, the channel gains for
each of the K users must satisfy D − 1 inequalities similar
to (15). Furthermore, satisfying a set of K(D − 1) of such
inequalities by the K users is sufficient for existence of Nash
equilibrium but the uniqueness is not guaranteed. For example,
for the case of K = D = 2, the 4 possible equilibria can be
characterized as follows.
• For both users to transmit on the first carrier at equilib-
rium, we must have h11
h12
> Θ2 and h21h22 > Θ2.
• For both users to transmit on the second carrier at
equilibrium, we must have h12
h11
> Θ2 and h22h21 > Θ2.
• For user 1 and user 2 to transmit on the first and
second carriers, respectively, at equilibrium, we must
have h11
h12
> Θ0 and h22h21 > Θ0.
• For user 1 and user 2 to transmit on the second and
first carriers, respectively, at equilibrium, we must have
h12
h11
> Θ0 and h21h22 > Θ0.
Fig. 1 shows the regions corresponding to the above four
equilibria. It can be seen that for certain values of channel
gains there is no Nash equilibrium and for some values of
channel gains there are two equilibria.
V. A DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
In this section, we present an iterative and distributed
algorithm for reaching the Nash equilibrium (if it exists) for
the proposed power control game. The description of the
algorithm is as follows.
1) Let k = 1
2) Given the transmit powers of other users, user k picks
the carrier whose effective channel gain (i.e. hˆkℓ) is the
largest and transmits only on that carrier at a power level
equal to p∗k
3) k = k + 1
4) If k ≤ K then go back to step 2
5) Stop if the powers have converged, otherwise go to
step 1
It is clear that if the above algorithm converges, it will
converge to a Nash equilibrium. It is also demonstrated in
Section VII that the algorithm converges when a Nash equi-
librium exists. In the case of multiple Nash equilibria, the
above algorithm converges to one of the equilibria depending
on the starting point.
VI. SPECIAL CASE OF TWO CARRIERS
To gain some insight into the properties of the Nash
equilibria for our proposed game, let us concentrate on a
system with two carriers and two users (i.e. D = K = 2).
We assume that the channel amplitudes are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) among users and carriers. If
we assume Rayleigh fading (with mean 1) for the channel
amplitudes then the channel gains, hkℓ’s, will be i.i.d. with
exponential distribution of mean 1. Let X1 be the random
variable corresponding to the number of users that transmit
over the first carrier at equilibrium. If we assume N > γ∗,
then, based on Proposition 2, the probability that both users
transmit on the first carrier at equilibrium (i.e. X1 = 2) is
given by
PX1(2) = Pr{X1 = 2}
= Pr
{
h11
h12
> Θ2,
h21
h22
> Θ2
}
=
(
1
1 + Θ2
)2
.(22)
Similarly, the probability of both users transmitting on the
second carrier at equilibrium is
PX1(0) = Pr{X1 = 0}
= Pr
{
h12
h11
> Θ2,
h22
h21
> Θ2
}
=
(
1
1 + Θ2
)2
.(23)
The probability of one user transmitting on each of the two
carriers can be found to be
PX1(1) = Pr{X1 = 1} = 2
(
1
1 + Θ0
)2
−
(
1−Θ0
1 + Θ0
)2
.
(24)
Consequently, the probability that no Nash equilibrium exists
is given by
Po = Pr{No Nash equilibrium}
= 2
{(
Θ0
1 + Θ0
)2
−
(
1
1 + Θ2
)2}
. (25)
It should be noted that as the processing gain N becomes
larger, Θ0 and Θ1 approach 1 from below and above, respec-
tively. This results in a reduction in PX1 (1) but an increase in
PX1(0) and PX1(2), i.e. the probability mass function (pmf)
for X1 becomes flatter. However, the increase outweighs the
decrease and as a result Po decreases as N increases. Going
back to Fig. 1, we see that the region for which no Nash
equilibrium exists shrinks as N increases. In addition, the
region for which more than one equilibrium exists disappears
as N becomes very large. Therefore, we can say that as
the processing gain becomes large, the probability that the
proposed power control game has a unique Nash equilibrium
approaches one.
So far, the assumption has been that N > γ∗ so that both
users can achieve γ∗ even when they are transmitting over
the same carrier. For the case of N ≤ γ∗, the users cannot
achieve γ∗ simultaneously when they are transmitting on the
same carrier and hence they would end up transmitting at the
maximum power. Therefore, when N ≤ γ∗, the probability
of both users transmitting on the same carrier at equilibrium
is virtually zero, i.e. PX1 (2) = PX1 (0) ≈ 0. Hence, we have
Po = 2
(
Θ0
1+Θ0
)2
.
Although obtaining explicit expressions for the probabilities
of the occurrence of various Nash equilibria for the case of
K > 2 is difficult, many of the statements made for the case of
K = 2 are also valid when K > 2. Namely, as N increases the
pmf of X1 becomes wider and at the same time the probability
that no equilibrium exists becomes smaller. This means that
in the asymptotic case of large processing gain, the proposed
power control game has a unique equilibrium. Furthermore, for
very large values of N , the pmf of X1 can be approximated
as
PX1(m) = Pr{X1 = m} ≈
(
K
m
)(
1
2
)K
for m = 0, · · · ,K.
(26)
In the next section, we show the validity of these claims
using simulation.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We first consider the case of two carriers with two users. We
assume L = M = 100, R = 100 Kbps and σ2 = 5 × 10−16
Watts; and use f(γ) = (1− e−γ)M as the efficiency function.
For this efficiency function, γ∗ = 6.4 (=8.1dB). We assume
that the channel gains are i.i.d. with exponential distribution of
mean 1. We consider 20,000 realizations of channel gains. For
each realization, we run the algorithm proposed in Section V
for 20 iterations. If convergence is reached by the end of the
20th iteration, we record the number of users that transmit on
each carrier; otherwise, we assume there is no equilibrium.
For our simulations, Pmax is assumed to be very large which
translates to having no transmit power limit for the user
terminal.
It is observed that the distributed algorithm proposed in
Section V converges when a Nash equilibrium exists. Recall
that PX1(m) represents the probability that m users transmit
on the first carrier at equilibrium. Fig. 2 shows PX1 (2), PX1(1)
and Po (probability of no equilibrium) as a function of the
processing gain N . The analytical expressions obtained in
Section VI are also plotted. We see that there is a close
agreement between the simulation results and the analytical
values. It is also observed that as N becomes large, Po
approaches zero. For N = 16, for example, the probability
that a Nash equilibrium exists is about 93%. Since PX1 (0) is
identical to PX1(2), it is not shown in the figure.
Fig. 3 shows PX1(m) as a function of m for different values
of N . We can see from the figure that as the processing gain
increases, the pmf of X1 becomes flatter. This is because for
larger values of N , the system becomes more tolerant towards
interference. Therefore, the probability with which the two
users are able to transmit on the same carrier at equilibrium
increases.
We repeat the above experiment for the case of two carriers
and 10 users. Fig. 4 shows PX1(m) as a function of the
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Fig. 2. Probability of having m users on the first carrier at equilibrium,
PX1(m), for m = 1, 2 as well as probability of having no equilibrium are
shown for D = K = 2.
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Fig. 3. Probability mass function of X1 for different processing gains (D = 2
and K = 2)
processing gain. Due to symmetry, we have only plotted the
probabilities for m = 5, 6, ..., 10. The probability that no
equilibrium exists (Po) is also shown. Similar trends as those
observed in the case of K = 2 are also seen here. We
observe that here again as N becomes large, Po approaches
zero. PX1(m) as a function of m for different values of
N is plotted in Fig. 5. The asymptotic approximation for
PX1(m) which is given by (26) is also shown. We see from
the figure that as N increases the pmf of X1 becomes wider
because the system becomes more interference-tolerant. Also,
the equilibria for which the allocation of users to the carriers is
highly asymmetric (e.g. m = 9 and 10) are unlikely to happen.
In other words, with a high probability, the users are evenly
distributed between the two carriers. It should be noted that
when N is small, γ∗ cannot be achieved simultaneously by
all the users at the output of the matched filters. Therefore,
users keep increasing their transmit powers and hence no
equilibrium is reached. This is the case until N becomes large
enough so that it can accommodate at least 5 users on each
carrier (i.e. N > 25.6). In practice, however, if N is not large
enough, some or all users end up transmitting at the maximum
power.
We now compare the proposed approach, which jointly
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Fig. 4. Probability of having m users on the first carrier at equilibrium,
PX1(m), for m = 5, 6, · · · , 10 as well as probability of having no
equilibrium are shown for D = 2 and K = 10.
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Fig. 5. Probability mass function of X1 for different processing gains (D = 2
and K = 10)
maximizes each user’s utility over all carriers, with the ap-
proach that maximizes user’s utility independently over each
carrier. In the joint maximization approach each user transmits
only on the carrier that has the best effective channel whereas
in the other case, all users transmit on all the carriers such that
the output SIR on each carrier is γ∗. We consider a system
with 2 carriers and N = 128. We fix K and compute the
sum of the utilities achieved by all users for 20,000 channel
realizations. The utility for each case is the ratio of the total
transmitted bits over the two carriers divided by the total
energy consumed. Fig. 6 shows the average total utility vs. K
for the two approaches. We see a significant improvement in
the achieved utility when joint maximization over all carriers
is used. This is because when all the users transmit on every
carrier, they cause unnecessary interference. To achieve γ∗,
each user is hence forced to transmit at a higher power level
which in turn results in a considerable reduction in the overall
utility.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have modelled power control for multi-carrier CDMA
systems as a non-cooperative game in which each user needs to
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Fig. 6. Total Utility vs Number of Users (D = 2 and N = 128)
decide how much power to transmit over each carrier to max-
imize its overall utility. The utility function has been defined
as the overall throughput divided by the total transmit power
over all the carriers and has units of bits per joule. For this
utility function, we have shown that the utility is maximized
when each user transmits only on the carrier which has the
best “effective channel” for that user. In addition, we have
derived the conditions for existence of a Nash equilibrium and
proposed an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching the
equilibrium (if it exists). The properties of the Nash equilibria
for the proposed game have been studied. We have also
demonstrated the performance improvement resulting from the
proposed approach compared to the approach of independent
optimization over each carrier.
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